Since 2008, the EU has been supporting civil society in Western Balkans and Turkey through the Civil Society Facility (CSF), under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). Over the years, the Balkan Civil Society Development Network (BCSDN) has followed the evolution of EU’s financial support modalities and the progress of the CSF towards better responding to the needs of CSOs in the pre-accession countries, but there is still more to be done so the EU’s support to civil society improves further its effectiveness and efficiency, in a way that it contributes to a more vibrant, resilient and stronger civil society. Civil society in the new IPA III financial framework for the period 2021-2027 remains one of the priorities for intervention within the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and democracy thematic window. An important novelty in the IPA III is that civil society is also a cross-cutting theme in all five windows. The amount of funding, scope, priorities, and modalities of support to CSOs under the IPA III are yet to be determined, as the IPA programming is being finalized.
In times of growing constraints to civil society operations in the enlargement countries, as well as in the EU, and increasing undemocratic and illiberal sentiments – further exacerbated with the COIVD-19 pandemic – it will be crucial that the EU continues to firmly support a more enabling civil society environment, as a precondition for the existence of a strong civil society. Investment in civic education, civil society infrastructure and joint action would also be crucial to achieve this. The IPA implementing mechanisms should provide clear basis for defending the civic space and for responding to its immediate threats.
The EU should more effectively respond to cases of shrinking civic space and democratic backsliding in IPA beneficiary countries, and establish, to that end, close collaboration with organizations that regularly monitor the civic space on national level and alert of serious breaches. In such cases, instead of decreasing country allocations through the IPA III, funds should be reallocated to CSOs, enabling civil society to counter back such democratic relapse. While doing this, the EU can still make a strong political message and ‘punish’ unacceptable government behavior, without penalizing the whole society. Furthermore, in a situation of – what it seems – decreasing transformative power of EU, it might be the long-term investment the EU is looking for in safeguarding rule of law and good governance in the enlargement countries.
With this in mind, the EC should not consider assigning responsibility to governments for the management of EU funds for civil society yet. Most of the enlargement countries still lack sound, independent and transparent mechanisms for distributing public funds to CSOs3, and have misused them for exerting influence over the civil society. Therefore, before the EU assigns the management of its funds for CSOs to national authorities, it should first condition national governments to consistently manage their funds for civil society, in a clear and transparent manner. This should be the minimum criteria for demonstrating readiness to manage EU funds for civil society and a true willingness to use these funds as an investment to the overall societal development, rather than a tool to undermine and control civil society.
To contribute to the stronger financial viability of the civil society in enlargement countries, the new IPA III would have to address the lack of alternative funding sources on one hand, and the insufficiency of philanthropic culture, unfavorable tax framework, and absence of transparent public funding on the other.
Building on positive experiences with operational grants and long-term framework partnership agreements during IPA II, the EU should further utilize similar instruments and aim for increased core and long-term support for CSOs rather than short-term project support. This becomes even more important for the Western Balkans having in mind the harmful effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the already weak financial viability of the civil society in the region. For CSOs to be able cushion the blow of the pandemic, the EU needs to adjust its support mechanisms towards more flexible operational support, ensuring CSOs’ sustainability and supporting their immediate efforts, recovery needs and shifted priorities.
